The agreements signed between India and China between 1993 and 2013 are gradually being linked. According to sinologist B. R. Deepak, after the clash in the Galwan Valley, “all the agreements were effectively left in ruins.” [33] Many of the sections of these agreements had no impact on the situation on the ground at Bac. [46] Following the 1993 agreement, formal interaction between the two countries continued. In the military field, an officer exchange programme and high-level visits were carried out. The Vice Chief of the Chinese People`s Liberation Army and the Chinese Minister of Defense visited India, while the Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy visited China. [4] In 1960, officials from India and China held talks on the basis of an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai to settle the border dispute. [27] China and India disagreed on the large watershed that defined the boundary in Sector West. [27]:96 Chinese statements regarding their border claims often distorted the sources cited. [41] The Sino-Indian border dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute over the sovereignty of two relatively large and several smaller and distinct parts of the territory between China and India. The first, Aksai Chin, is claimed by China as part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and tibet Autonomous Region, and claimed by India as part of the Ladakh Union Territory; It is a virtually uninhabited high mountain desert in the major regions of Kashmir and Tibet and is crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway.
The other disputed area lies south of the McMahon Line, formerly known as the North East Frontier Agency and now called Arunachal Pradesh. The McMahon Line was part of the Simla Convention of 1914, which was signed between British India and Tibet without China`s consent. [1] As of 2020, India continues to claim that the McMahon Line is the legal border to the east. China has never accepted this border, claiming that Tibet was never independent when it signed the Simla Convention. India drafted the original version of the agreement. [23] It has been suggested that the border could be called the line of peace or tranquility. [25] But China introduced the term “active line of control.” It seemed to Shivshankar Menon, one of the negotiators and writers, that the Chinese wanted a term they proposed to use. This insistence was a greater part of their practice of ensuring psychological dominance. In the end, the two sides agreed on the term actual line of control, the term Zhou had used in 1959.
[26] This was the first bilateral agreement between China and India in 1993, which included the term effective line of control. [22] तीन साल बाद 1996 में समझौते को बढ़ाया गया1993 के समझौते को तीन साल बाद बढ़ाया गया। 1996 में भारत दौरे पर आए चीनी राष्ट्रपति जियांग जेमिन और तब के भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री एचडी देवेगौड़ा ने नए समझौते पर साइन किए। The first round of border talks took place in December 1981. Negligible progress has been made in the first three rounds of talks. [15] In the fourth round, it was decided that other areas of relations should be normalised without linking them to border issues. [16] This led to a reduction in tensions to such an extent that during the fifth cycle, the border issue was again tackled head-on, but for many reasons, including domestic incidents such as the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, no final results were achieved. [16] The seventh round in July 1986 took place in the context of the Sumdorong Chu impasse. [17] The eighth cycle eventually led to a visit by the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988,[17] a visit by the Chinese Prime Minister to India in 1992, and then a visit by the Indian President to China in 1992. All this preceded and led to the 1993 agreement.
[11] [18] The Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Border Issue was established in 1988 to recommend solutions to the border dispute. [a] [19] Prior to the 1993 Agreement, a Trade Agreement was signed in 1984, followed by a Cultural Cooperation Agreement in 1988. [11] [20] The military dialogue was also initiated with corresponding visits to the Indian National Defence College and the National Defence University of the People`s Liberation Army in 1990 and 1992. [4] In July 1992, the Indian Minister of Defence visited China. [4] There was also an exchange between different think tanks from the two countries. [4] The Johnson Line is not used west of the Karakoram Pass, where China borders Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan. On October 13, 1962, China and Pakistan began negotiations across the border west of the Karakoram Pass. In 1963, the two countries set their borders largely on the basis of the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which left the Trans Karakoram Tract 5,800 km2 (2,200 square miles) / 5,180 km2 (2,000 square miles) in China, although the agreement provided for renegotiation in the event of a settlement of the Kashmir conflict. India does not recognize that Pakistan and China share a border and claims the treaty as part of the pre-1947 state of Kashmir and Jammu. However, India`s claim line in this region does not extend as far north of the Karakoram Mountains as the Johnson Line. China and India still have disputes over these borders.
[13] The agreement was signed in New Delhi during a state visit by the Chinese president. This was the first visit by a Chinese president to India. [35] The agreement was opened by a reference to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 1993 agreement. [3] The twelve articles make it clear that the agreement is a non-war agreement, that the final solution to the border issue remains in place and that the LAC must be respected. It states that military deployment should be limited and details on how to deal with military exercises, air intrusions, overflights and landings of military aircraft near the LAC. It aims to prevent “dangerous military activities” in the vicinity of LAC, covers confidence-building measures such as “flag meetings and telecommunications” and deals with the accidental crossing of LAC. It reiterates that clarification may be sought with regard to the Agreement and LAC, as well as ratification issues. The agreement recognises that there are different perceptions in certain areas along the LAC. [4] [3] Article 10 of the Agreement referred to the exchange of cards between the two countries. Initially, there had been some progress in card exchange.
India and China exchanged cards from the Barahoti sector in the second half of 2000. In June 2001, the Indian and Chinese sides held the first in-depth discussion on LAC in Sector Central. [36] Sikkim cards were also exchanged. [37] This resulted in the “Memorandum on Border Trade Development.” [37] [38] However, when maps of other sectors were exchanged, particularly the western sector,[39][40][41] perceptions varied greatly to such an extent that the process stopped around 2002/2003. [42] [43] In July 2020, China`s ambassador to India said Beijing was not interested in continuing the card exchange process, which was halted in 2002. [44] One of the drawbacks of the card exchange process was that it “encouraged exaggeration of their assertions about lac`s whereabouts.” [45] During and after the 1950s, when India began patrolling and mapping this area in more detail, they confirmed what the 1914 Simla Accord map represented: six river crossings that interrupted the main ridge of the Himalayan watershed. At the westernmost point near Bhutan north of Tawang, they modified their maps to extend their claim line northward to include features such as Thag La Ridge, Longju and Khinzemane as Indian territory. [13] Thus, the Indian version of the McMahon Line moves the Bhutan-China-India trijunction from 27°45`40″N north to 27°51`30″N.[13] India would claim that the contract map ran along features such as Thag La Ridge, although the contract map itself is topographically vague in places (since the treaty was not accompanied by a demarcation), shows a straight line (no watershed) near Bhutan and near Thag La, and the contract does not contain a verbal description of the geographical features or the highest ridges. [13] [35] After 3 years, both sides had made it clear that their troops must exercise self-control in the event of a confrontation.
The Chinese side that violated the agreement showed no self-control, as evidenced by the injuries sustained by Indian soldiers during the clashes. .